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
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MBFR: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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recent technological innovations on the conventional balance; the role of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the talks; and the major proposals offered by the two alliances. Additionally, the proposals are viewed from the perspectives of the various participants (both inter and intra-alliance politics), with a view towards predicting possible concessions on the major stumbling blocks to an agreement. Also included is an analysis of major issues preventing agreement, such as collectivity and parity, the data issue and the geographical problem. Finally, the paper evaluates the prospects for progress under the current negotiating environment, and concludes with a suggestion for a possible new approach for NATO at Vienna.

A research requirement for the Master of Arts of International Studies at the American University.

Major proposals: Soviet goals at Vienna; the balance; forward based systems; political aspects of NATO; the power issue; cruise missiles; gray area technology; nuclear war; NATO (NAT) talks; conventional balance NATO Guidelines Area; non-

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MBFR: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

by

Robert W. Hess

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PREFACE

The beginning of 1978 marked the start of the fifth year of negotiations in Vienna in an attempt to reach agreement on "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures" (MRFAAMCE) between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹ In attempting to evaluate the progress, or lack thereof, achieved thus far at Vienna, it is important to bear in mind that the negotiations are only one of several active forums dealing with the arms control issue, and that the MBFR (mutual and balanced force reduction) talks, as the NATO members prefer to refer to the negotiations, are closely interrelated with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which are currently experiencing so much difficulty. Until the present, the MBFR talks have clearly taken a back seat to the SALT negotiations, which is understandable since it is unlikely that the Soviets will seriously negotiate a regional arms control agreement prior to establishing the global balance.

¹Direct participants in the negotiations are those having troops in the reduction area: The United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux, and the United Kingdom on the Western Side; the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern Side. Special participants on the NATO side are Norway, Denmark, Italy and Greece; for the Warsaw Pact Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The reduction area (NATO Guidelines Area) encompasses the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

While no major achievements have been made in either the SALT or MBFR negotiations thus far, both of these issue areas have become more critical since the heightening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet actions in Africa. Amid the controversy in the Carter Administration over the proper response to the Soviet moves,¹ fears were expressed that the United States was returning to a period of "confrontation" with the Soviet Union. Indeed, President Carter's foreign policy speech at Annapolis invited the Soviets to "... choose either confrontation or cooperation,"² not exactly an invitation in character with detente. With the SALT negotiations possibly becoming part of a new program of "linkage" politics, the prospects for success at the Vienna negotiations are also cast in some doubt. Although First Secretary Brezhnev recently made a concession to the Western position at Vienna, this may well be an attempt to lessen the current threat to detente without making a major concession in the more important SALT negotiations.

In attempting to assess the achievements and prospects for the Vienna talks, it is first necessary to analyze the current international environment, and to ascertain the political and military goals of the major participants. The evolving relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as East-West relations in general, are particularly important, since they frame the conditions of detente within which the negotiations take place. The military balance has

¹"Tug of War Over Foreign Policy," US News & World Report, June 19, 1978, pp. 37-40.

²"Our Nations Goals ... Will Ultimately Prevail," Washington Post, June 8, 1978, p. A21.

experienced a significant change since the talks were initiated in 1973, both in quantities of weapons and in the qualitative and technological fields. A significant aspect of the military balance deals with the theater nuclear balance, or at least with the role that tactical nuclear weapons play in the military strategies of the respective alliances.

The most important aspect of the MBFR negotiations, however, deals with the intra- and inter-alliance politics involved in developing the respective proposals. This is particularly true of the United States and its relations with the European NATO members, since the intra-alliance politics of the Warsaw Pact are mostly unobservable. If nothing else, the MBFR negotiations have generated a large body of literature on the topic, much of it technical in nature, that has served to highlight many shortcomings within NATO itself. The proposals offered by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the past five years, along with the current problems in detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, are indicative of the prospects for success at Vienna.

CHAPTER I

A SEARCH FOR SECURITY

On June 23, 1973, following a period of five months of preliminary negotiations in Vienna, the United States, the Soviet Union, and seventeen other states agreed to begin talks on "Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe" (MRFAAMCE). The preceding five months of preparatory consultations had dealt with a number of significant issues, most of which proved difficult to solve. The initial atmosphere was established by the Soviet delegation leader Oleg N. Khlestov, who referred to the "talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe."¹ This, even though the NATO members had specifically referred to the talks as "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction" (MBFR) negotiations as early as the Reykjavik Communique in 1968.² The differences between the two titles pointed out significant differences in interpretations of the purpose for the negotiations and highlighted differences in goals. Since the NATO participants eventually agreed to drop the term "balanced" from the title of the negotiations, the Vienna talks will hereafter be referred to as the Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) negotiations.

¹Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Force Reductions in Europe, SIPRI Monograph (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 19.

²"Reykjavik Communique," Survival (September 1968), pp. 297-299.

While the MFR negotiations finally got underway in the Summer of 1973, they did not represent the first efforts at force reductions in the postwar period. Both the Soviet Union and the United States made a series of such proposals in the 1950's and early 60's. The United States' initial plans for the postwar security of Europe were summarized by President Roosevelt, when he told Winston Churchill in 1945 at Yalta that the American occupation in Germany would be limited to two years and that "the United States would take all reasonable steps to preserve peace, but not at the expense of keeping an army in Europe, three thousand miles away from home."³ However, this commitment was made by Roosevelt in the euphoria of wartime cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and before those Soviet actions in Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia which eventually evolved into the "Cold War." Less than two years later, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes recognized the new realities of postwar Europe during a speech in Stuttgart in September 1946: "Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period ... We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing. We are staying here and will furnish our proportionate share of the security forces."⁴ The postwar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was, however, primarily political in nature. The question being the fate of Eastern Europe, and more centrally, the ultimate fate of a defeated Nazi Germany. The

³Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 5, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 353.

⁴U.S. State Department, Germany 1947-1949! The Story in Documents, State Department Publication 3556 (Washington, D.C., 1950), p. 7.

political situation deteriorated following the elections of the new Polish government in 1947 and the Czech coup in 1948, culminating in the Berlin blockade and a complete breakdown of quadripartite control of Germany.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

These political events were exacerbated by several significant incidents in the military realm. First, the Soviet Union exploded her first atomic device in 1949, well ahead of expectations, breaking the American monopoly on atomic weapons. Second, the invasion of South Korea, ostensibly with at least the acquiescence of the Soviet Union, drew attention to the parallel between the Korean and the German situations and the possible danger to Western Europe. These two events had a dramatic impact on the military structure in the West. Following the invasion of South Korea, the United States launched an active campaign aimed at rearming West Germany under the auspices of NATO, so that she could participate in the defense of Western Europe.⁵ Although it would take five more years and the defeat of the French proposed European Defense Community before Germany would join NATO, the Germany rearmament issue clarified the point that American military forces were no longer in Germany as occupation forces, but in a partnership to protect West Germany and the rest of Western Europe against the Soviet threat. The Korean war scare led to the Lisbon NATO conference in 1952, where it

⁵Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 41.

was decided to establish the ill-fated 96 division force.⁶ Further, the United States deployed an additional four divisions to Europe in an attempt to make NATO's posture more credible. As a result of these actions, the number of American military personnel stationed in Europe increased from a postwar low of 145,000 in 1950 to 427,000 in 1953.⁷

The obvious inability of NATO to attain the Lisbon force goals triggered another reaction in the United States which came to be called the "New Look" defense policy. Essentially, this policy codified the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe as a means of offsetting the insufficiency of NATO's conventional force structure. Secretary of State Dulles outlined the basic elements of the "New Look" strategy in a January 1954 speech which stated that the new defense policy would "depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."⁸ This doctrine established a link between the new strategic doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" and the tactical nuclear weapons then being deployed into the European theater. The use of tactical nuclear weapons was formally adopted by The United States in 1953, and the doctrine was officially promulgated as the "Overall Strategic Concept for the NATO Area (NATO Document MC 14/2) in March 1957."⁹

⁶SIPRI, op. cit., p. 25.

⁷Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 93.

⁸John Foster Dulles, as quoted in Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 12.

⁹Wolfgang Heisenberg, The Alliance in Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons, no. 96 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 2.

The European NATO members were initially satisfied with the "New Look" strategy, since it provided the ultimate protection of the United States' strategic nuclear force, while making it possible to forego a large conventional force buildup because of the linkage between NATO's tactical nuclear forces and the American strategic deterrent. The result of these interactions was to place NATO in a position of conventional inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which was offset by the American strategic deterrent. This situation existed until the late 1960's when the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was altered. It should be noted, however, that Americans and Europeans took a markedly different view of the postwar military balance. While the United States tended to view the balance more in terms of its military aspects, the European NATO members generally adopted a more political perception.

THE POLITICAL MILIEU

From almost any perspective, the dominant postwar issue was the necessity to solve the "German question," both for the Soviet Union and for the United States. Early postwar force reduction proposals all revolved around Germany. Western proposals, such as the Eden Plan in 1954, were designed to provide for the reunification of Germany and its eventual movement into the Western European community. Soviet proposals, on the other hand, were aimed at reunification, but with the ultimate objective of a Germany under Soviet dominance, or at least a "neutralized" German state.

The basic positions of the two sides were established at the conference of Foreign Ministers in Berlin in 1954 and the Geneva summit meeting the following year. The Soviet proposals were put forward at the Berlin conference in two parts. The first proposal detailed the provisions of a draft Germany peace treaty; the second proposed a draft European security treaty. Essentially, the draft Germany peace treaty reiterated the 1952 Soviet proposal and included a neutralized Germany, precluded from joining any alliance against any World War II allied nation; the withdrawal of all occupying troops; and the elimination of all foreign military bases in the country within one year after the conclusion of the treaty.¹⁰

The second proposal outlined a European Security System (ESS), which was clearly an attempt to develop a collective security system for all European states.¹¹ Since the United States was a non-European nation it would have been limited to observer status, thus making the Soviet Union the pre-eminent nation state and providing the political leverage the Soviets were seeking. Even though the Soviet Union signed the Austrian Peace Treaty in 1955, thus offering West Germany neutralization as an alternative to rearmament and continued partition, Konrad Adenauer signed the accords taking Germany into NATO in 1955. Following the

¹⁰William B. Prendergast, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: Issues and Prospects (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1978), p. 6.

¹¹Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Attitudes Toward MBFR and the U.S.S.R.'s Military Presence in Europe (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1972), p. 9.

Federal Republic's entry into NATO, Soviet policies switched to a program of gaining recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and assuring its continued viability. Following the Federal Republic's entry into NATO, the two Germanies quickly became linchpins in their respective alliances. West Germany became the center of NATO strategy, as well as the center of the United States' European policy, until the second Berlin crisis, when the United States began to dismantle the German reunification precondition as the keystone of its relations with the Soviet Union. The GDR, on the other hand, became equally as important to the Soviet Union, both in the military and the political contexts, especially the latter.

The Soviet Union proposed some sixty-six plans between 1955 and 1962,¹² all of which were directed in some degree toward reaching a solution to the German problem. The plans variously included proposals for the removal of nuclear weapons from the FRG; the complete or partial withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in Germany; limitations on armaments in adjoining countries; and finally, some type of confidence measures to prevent surprise attack.¹³ These approaches were, however, manifestations of Soviet attempts to control the rearmament of the Federal Republic, and if possible its access to any kind of nuclear weapons.

¹²Robert J. Ranger, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: Underlying Issues and Potential Developments (Ottawa, Canada: DRAE Memorandum, Department of National Defense, 1976), p. 4.

¹³Ibid., pp. 4-5.

NATO rejected these proposals on the grounds that they represented nothing more than Soviet attempts to destroy the political viability of the FRG, and to reduce the viability of NATO's defensive posture.

AN ERA OF DETENTE

No real movement towards arms control was possible during the early postwar confrontation period. Following the second Berlin crisis when the United States' acceptance of the Berlin wall signaled at least a de facto American recognition of the GDR, the Soviet Union and the United States began a slow movement towards detente. This movement was accelerated following the Cuban missile scare, and resulted in the Hotline Agreement and the Partial Test Ban Treaty. These events made it apparent to the Soviets that the United States was not inclined to use its strategic superiority in an attempt to force a change in the European status quo.

In addition to these aspects of Soviet-American relations, other events occurred which increased the momentum behind detente. First, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated while the United States' attitude towards the Peoples Republic of China began a gradual softening, culminating in a complete policy reversal under the Nixon Administration. Along with these shifts, the failure of the Multi-Lateral Nuclear Force (MLF) proposal, and General de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command provided the Soviet Union with an increased sense of security vis-a-vis NATO.

In addition to the tacit recognition of the GDR by the United States, the beginning of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1969 provided the Soviet Union with the requisite reassurances concerning the viability of

the GDR, and allowed the Soviet Union to actively embark on a program to repair the damage done to East-West relations by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Progress in this direction was marked by the initiation of Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) talks with the Nixon Administration, which resulted in the signing of a SALT I accord in 1972, and an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war in 1973.

THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

From 1969 to 1973 the Soviet Union placed considerably more emphasis on convening a European Security Conference than it did on joining in any conventional force reduction talks.¹⁴ This was understandable since the Soviet Union was still primarily interested in securing multi-lateral recognition of postwar boundaries in Eastern Europe, rather than negotiating to reduce its forces stationed there.¹⁵ However, the Soviets indicated their sensitivity to the Western situation when Secretary Brezhnev made his "wine tasting" speech at Tiflis in 1971, which has been interpreted as a move by the Soviets to forestall unilateral American force reductions.¹⁶ This move was not prompted by a desire for the retention of American troops, but rather to preclude pushing the

¹⁴Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet-American Relations: One-half Decade of Detente: Problems and Issues. The Atlantic Papers, No. 5 (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1975), p. 18.

¹⁵Ranger, op. cit., p. x.

¹⁶C.G. Jacobsen, SALT: MBFR: Soviet Perspectives on Security and Arms Negotiations (Ottawa, Canada: DRAE Memorandum, Department of National Defense, 1974), p. 40.

European NATO members into a position of greater responsibility, and perhaps an increased role for the Federal Republic of Germany. It is also doubtful that the Soviet Union anticipated any significant reduction in its force levels, since Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe provided a sense of security and assisted in maintaining Soviet influence in the region, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

However, none of the Soviet proposals on force reductions would have resulted in a loss of security for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviets finally agreed to participate in negotiations for troop reductions in Central Europe, but only as a quid pro quo for President Nixon's agreement, at the Moscow summit in May of 1972, to the convening of a Conference on European Security and Cooperation.¹⁷ It seems clear that the Soviet Union entertained no real interest in troop reduction negotiations other than as a necessary step towards the recognition of the postwar status quo in Eastern Europe. Since this political goal was attained with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, it is questionable as to what further interest the Soviets may have in MFR, other than possibly sowing seeds of distrust and dissension within the ranks of NATO. Writing in

¹⁷U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, May 3, 1973, pp. 14-18, 33-34.

1973, the head of the Soviet delegation pointed out the political nature of the Soviet approach to MFR:

The conclusion of treaties by the Soviet Union and Poland with the Federal Republic of Germany, the regulation of relations between the Federal Republic and the Germany Democratic Republic ... major efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and the United States ... and the start of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have created conditions which have allowed discussion on the reduction of armed forces to be started.¹⁸

Khlestov further noted that one of the most important issues decided during the preparatory talks was that the negotiations would be conducted in such a manner that "... they do not impair the security of any of the parties."¹⁹ The Soviet negotiators in Vienna have adhered to a strict interpretation of that statement since the inception of the talks in 1973, which accounts to a great extent for the lack of progress.

THE NATO PERSPECTIVE

NATO's movement towards force reduction talks resulted from a somewhat different motivation than that of the Soviets. The distance between American and Soviet objectives in early postwar arms control negotiations is well illustrated by the American response to the Atomic Free Zone (AFZ)

¹⁸Oleg N. Khlestov, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe," Survival (November/December 1974): 293.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 294.

proposals made by First Secretary Khrushchev in the first half of 1959. The Soviet proposals were always vague concerning the specific provisions designed to implement them, and were clearly political attempts to solve the Germany nuclear armament problem.²⁰ The American response, the Herter Plan, advanced what in essence was a technical arms control proposal. The Herter Plan adopted some of the provisions of the Soviet proposal for the physical withdrawal of nuclear weapons, but would have allowed a reunified Germany to remain within NATO, clearly contrary to the Soviet objective.²¹ To a very great extent, postwar American proposals have concentrated on achieving military stability through the technical control of arms levels on specific armaments, rather than dealing with the political issues involved. The initial Western proposals at Vienna, discussed below, bear evidence of this approach.

The increasing American involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960's, as well as worsening economic conditions, resulted in a wave of domestic pressure against the continued stationing of American troops in Europe. Senator Mansfield first responded to this pressure in 1966 when he submitted a resolution demanding a "substantial reduction of U.S. Forces permanently stationed in Europe."²² Although defeated, the resolution

²⁰Ranger, op. cit., p. 19.

²¹Ibid., p. 20.

²²Prendergast, op. cit., p. 17.

resulted in the development of a dual-basing program, which had the effect of reducing American troops in Europe by some 35,000 by 1967.²³

Adverse economic and political pressures on both sides of the Atlantic resulted in a search for a cheaper force structure. This search yielded the adoption of the "Future Tasks of the Alliance," (The Harmel Report) by the North Atlantic Council in 1967. The report noted that:

The Allies are studying disarmament and political arms control measures, including the possibilities of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the allies to work for an effective detente with the East.²⁴

Six months later at Reykjavik, NATO issued a declaration entitled "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions," which stated that the NATO ministers "agreed that it was desirable that a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated."²⁵ The next major step for NATO came following the May 1970 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Rome. A new document, the Rome Declaration (Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) was adopted, and an invitation was again extended to the Warsaw Pact to enter into negotiations.²⁶ No answer was received, however, until Leonid Brezhnev's Tiflis speech in 1971, and agreement was not reached to begin negotiations until the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Harmel Report, Survival V (February 1968): 62-64.

²⁵Prendergast, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁶SIPRI, op. cit., p. 14.

When the negotiations finally began in Vienna in 1973, they represented the culmination of over 25 years of arms control and disarmament proposals, of which the Austrian State Treaty is the only positive result. The undistinguished record of the early postwar negotiations stemmed primarily from the differing objectives of the participants. Even though the era of detente that existed since the mid-1960's has provided a more favorable climate for the present reduction talks, there is no evidence that the goals of the participants have materially changed. The Soviet Union agreed to the MFR talks only as a means for securing Western agreement to the convening of CSCE, while just the opposite was true for the West. NATO, both the United States and the European Members, initially responded to MFR as a means of preventing American unilateral force reductions following from the 1971 Mansfield proposals, although for differing reasons. These differing points of view have been reflected not only in the proposals submitted by the respective alliances, but in the changing military balance in Europe as well.

CHAPTER II

THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE

Along with the political aspects of the Vienna talks, the problem of the conventional balance in the NATO Guidelines Area is obviously critical to the entire negotiating process, especially since both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have committed themselves to reducing their forces only without endangering the security of their respective alliances. However, the two blocs each have a somewhat different perspective as to what constitutes "undiminished security" for the opposite party. The issue, however, concerns not only if a balance exists and in whose favor, but how to actually define the elements that constitute that balance.

There appears to be no general consensus in the West as to exactly how the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be evaluated. Analysts strongly disagree concerning the balance, with some observers indicating that NATO either clearly outnumbers the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, or that NATO has sufficient forces to attain an equal balance with the Warsaw Pact with the proper improvements and restructuring.¹

¹Alain C. Enthoven, "U.S. Forces in Europe: How Many? Doing What?" Foreign Affairs (April 1975): pp. 514-515.

On the other hand, other observers take the view that "NATO is quantitatively outclassed by the Warsaw Pact in almost every category, and is losing its qualitative edge in several respects that count."² Official statements during the initial stages of the negotiations concluded that "At present, although resources are roughly equal, the NATO conventional defense posture is somewhat inferior to the Warsaw Pact...."³ Moreover, in the spring of 1977, Senator Nunn would write that the Warsaw Pact now possesses the "... ability to deliver a potentially devastating attack against NATO unattended by the telltale prior callup and transfer to Central Europe of Soviet reinforcements from the U.S.S.R."⁴ Senator Nunn's statement not only highlighted the markedly more pessimistic outlook of many analysts, but introduced one of the outside issues that makes developing a NATO-Warsaw Pact "balance" so difficult.

There are a number of methods which can be used in attempting to weigh the capabilities of the two alliances, often yielding different results using the same data. One group of methods can be termed "static," since they essentially take a snapshot of current capabilities weighted

²John M. Collins, Imbalance of Power: Shifting U.S. - Soviet Military Strength (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 228.

³U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services: Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 6.

⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services: NATO and the New Soviet Threat (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 4.

by estimates of future capabilities, while a second category, "dynamic" models, would attempt to "wargame" the existing data through the development of military models and simulations in search of a more realistic balance. Most analyses, however, deal with the static method, since the dynamic mode is considerably more intricate and much more difficult to deal with effectively.

PROBLEMS OF COMPARISON

Static comparisons most often rely on simple quantitative comparisons of certain categories of capabilities, such as manpower, the number of combat units, or quantities of key weapons (tanks, artillery, aircraft). But even these simple measurements are not immune to variances of interpretation. Some analysts, for example, exclude all French forces, even the two French divisions stationed in Germany, from the manpower estimates since they have no assigned sector in NATO's defensive plan.⁵ Other sources include them in the comparison based on the assumption that they would certainly participate in any military action against NATO since the conflict would inevitably include France herself.⁶ Disagreements also exist over how to evaluate the qualitative differences in weapons, how units should be rated when using firepower scores, and even what conclusions to draw from identical data. The following sections attempt to

⁵Collins, op. cit., p. 234.

⁶The Military Balance: 1977-1978 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 110.

provide an essentially static comparison of the present conventional balance on the central front, as well as the major disagreements with the data, if any.

THE MANPOWER ISSUE

The data presented in table 2-1 is derived from computations prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and should provide a somewhat less biased outlook than some other sources. As shown in

Table 2-1

MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT IN THE GUIDELINES AREA

	Personnel		Equipment	
	Ground	Air	Tanks	Aircraft
NATO				
Belgium	62	19	300	145
Britian	58	9	575	145
Canada	3	2	30	50
Netherlands	75	18	500	160
United States	193	35	2,000	335
West Germany	341	18	3,000	509
subtotal	732	193	6,405	1,374
France	50	14	325	557
total	782	207	6,730	1,931
WARSAW PACT				
Czechoslovakia	135	46	2,500	550
East Germany	105	36	1,550	375
Poland	220	62	2,900	850
U.S.S.R.	475	60	9,250	1,300
total	935(805) ^a	204	16,200	3,075

Source-derived from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1977-1978 (London: 1977), p. 110.

^a Strength of Warsaw Pact ground forces as tabled by the Pact at Vienna on 10 June 1976.

table 2-1, the manpower ratios conform closely to the NATO figures presently being used in Vienna. NATO negotiations are based on figures of approximately 777,000 for NATO and between 925,000 and 950,000 for the Warsaw Pact.⁷ This comparison indicates that a significant disparity exists in manpower in the reduction area (formerly called The NATO Guidelines Area) in favor of the Warsaw Pact. However, some comparisons have included the bulk of the French ground forces in the comparison, some 330,000 troops, which would alter the balance in favor of NATO. Based on the recent statements of the French government, however, most studies continue to show the commitment of French troops as a possibility only. This comparison is also somewhat artificial since the forces of other NATO members (Portugal, Turkey, Italy, Norway and Greece) are not included, nor are the remaining members of the Warsaw Pact (Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria) counted. Moreover, this type of comparison points up some of the problems which will be associated with any draft agreement which might be reached at Vienna. Comparisons based solely on total manpower figures have been criticized since they cannot make allowances or weight the balance in accordance with the effects of initiative versus instinctive obedience to orders, or technological expertise as opposed to physical toughness.⁸

DIVISIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

Another type of comparison seeks to define the balance using units, since they measure the actual manpower available for the projection of

⁷"West Questions Soviet Figures on Troops," Washington Star, June 17, 1976, p. 4.

⁸Collins, op. cit., p. 8.

combat power. Using the Northern and Central European regions as a focal point, a strict comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact deployed divisions places NATO at a distinct disadvantage. Table 2-2 compares the number and type of units fielded by the respective alliances. Although more

Table 2-2

GROUND FORCES DEPLOYED IN PEACETIME^a

Available Peacetime Ground Forces ^d	Northern & Central Europe ^b			Southern Europe ^c		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which) Soviet	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which) Soviet
Armd	10	32	22	4	6	2
Mech	13	33	20	7	24	7
Inf & AB	4	5	3	26	3	2

^aSource - The Military Balance 1977-1978, pp. 102-103.

^bIncludes the commands of AFCEM and AFNORTH, France not included.

^cIncludes Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces and those American and British units that would normally be committed to the Mediterranean Theater of operations; for the Warsaw Pact, the ground forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and South-Western U.S.S.R. that might be committed to the Mediterranean Theater.

^dDivisional equivalents based on three brigades comprising a division.

Soviet divisions are included in the Central European column because of the inclusion of the northern European area, this table provides a more comprehensive comparison of NATO versus Warsaw Pact deployments. In addition, it serves to explain the fears the flank countries initially harbored over the possibility that Soviet forces involved in a reduction agreement would simply be shifted from the reduction area to the flanks.

On the face of this comparison it would appear that the Warsaw Pact has a distinct advantage over NATO in combat units. However, any serious analyst would immediately question the conclusions to be drawn from a such comparison for several reasons. First, NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions are not equal in size nor in the quantity and quality of their major weapons systems. A detailed table listing all of the equipment contained in the various types of divisions is beyond the scope of this study, however, it is readily available.⁹ A study of the various force structures reveals that, for example, while American and German armored divisions have roughly the same number of tanks as a Soviet armored division (324 and 300 respectively to 325), divisional manpower strength is 16,500 and 17,000 to 11,000.¹⁰ Similar disparities exist in comparisons of mechanized divisions. The difference in numbers of men is explained by the logistics aspect, with the larger American and West German divisions organized for longer periods of combat, while Soviet forces are designed to fit a short-war blitzkrieg strategy.

In addition, analysts would point out that the political reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces is highly suspect. American intelligence studies indicate that none of the Hungarian, Romanian or

⁹John M. Collins, Imbalance of Power: Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strength (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978); and The Military Balance 1977-1978 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978). Collins provides a pessimistic, worst case type of comparison, while The Military Balance is more impartial.

¹⁰The Military Balance, op. cit., p. vii; Robert L. Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces. Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 9.

Bulgarian forces would participate in an invasion of NATO territory,¹¹ while other studies seem to indicate that all six East German divisions are assigned combat missions, but only nine of the fifteen Polish divisions and six of the ten Czech units have similar missions. If one accepts these conditions, then the balance against NATO is eased slightly. Moreover, six of the Warsaw Pact units listed in table 2-2 are not in a combat ready status. To further equal the balance, studies show that the East German, Polish and Czechoslovakian armored and mechanized units continue to be armed primarily with the obsolescent T-54/55 tank; although some T-62s have started to be issued.¹³ Table 2-1 provides a comparison of the overall numbers of tanks deployed on the central front by the two alliances.

AIR FORCES

Another major category for force comparison concerns the tactical air forces available to the respective alliances. Again, table 2-1 provides a comparison which would seem to give the advantages to the Warsaw Pact, although if the French tactical air forces are included the ratio is not quite as lopsided. French air units are included based on the same assumption used to justify the expectation of the commitment of at least the two French divisions stationed in Germany to the defense of NATO; presumably French air and ground units would be employed together.

¹¹Lawrence and Record, op. cit., p. 14

¹²Collins, op. cit., p. 235.

¹³The Military Balance, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

As in the case of Warsaw Pact armored units, however, an analysis of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air forces indicates that they have not been equipped with newer versions of interceptor aircraft such as the MIG-23 and 25, nor the new models of ground attack aircraft.¹⁴ Thus, the Warsaw Pact continues to suffer from a technological inferiority to NATO air forces. Assessing the balance from the perspective of tactics, however, yields a somewhat different conclusion. Some studies indicate that NATO's tactical air forces are deficient in their ability to provide close air support to committed troops during the initial phases of a confrontation.¹⁵ These analyses indicate that less than twenty percent of NATO's tactical air forces are designed specifically for close air support,¹⁶ with the remainder being multi-purpose aircraft designed primarily to achieve air superiority. The requirement to achieve local air superiority as a necessary first step in providing adequate close air support is a matter of tactics for NATO planners. However, it has also been noted that the mission of Soviet frontal aviation units has been changed to deep interdiction operations, with Soviet ground forces being given the job of achieving their own air superiority through ground air defenses.¹⁷ If true,

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Lawrence and Record, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁶Of twenty-one U.S. Air Force tactical fighter wings only three are composed of aircraft optimally suited for close air support (the A-7) and none are assigned to Europe. Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁷Barry M. Blechman, et.al., The Soviet Military Buildup and U.S. Defense Spending (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 12-13.

this makes NATO air tactics slightly suspect. Also, there appears to be no planned increase in NATO's tactical air resources in the near future to offset this disparity, with most of the emphasis being directed towards increased technological capabilities in multi-role aircraft such as the F-15.¹⁸

The air balance on the central front is also subject to interpretation based on the capabilities of NATO aviators, who are generally considered superior to their Warsaw Pact counterparts in experience and training. NATO has so far refused to agree to force reductions of air units, with the exception of certain aircraft associated with the 1975 offer to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons. Once again, an analyst can support an evaluation of either NATO superiority or inferiority depending on which factors are weighted most heavily. The capabilities of the tactical air forces of the two alliances are, however, extremely important in attempting to evaluate the military balance.

TACTICS

In addition to simply attempting to compare the numbers of men and equipment, some studies attempt to evaluate these measures in terms of the tactics of the two alliances, an attempt to develop a somewhat "dynamic" evaluation using static indicators. Evaluations of NATO and Warsaw Pact force structures and deployment strategies usually indicate that NATO forces are structured for long-war defensive operations, while

¹⁸Trevor Cliffe, Military Technology and the European Balance. Adelphi Paper No. 89 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 15.

the Warsaw Pact is oriented towards short-war blitzkrieg offensive operations.¹⁹ The asymmetries in tactics between the two alliances are generally not challenged, but the conclusions reached are often quite different. Some schools of thought feel that since the Pact would be the attacker, and since terrain and other factors have traditionally favored the defender, NATO will be able to effectively defend itself with its lesser amount of forces. Other studies take note of the fact that the Warsaw Pact could mass its forces at any point it so chooses, normally on one of the three traditional avenues of approach,²⁰ and achieve a breakthrough which would unhinge the NATO defense.²¹

Compounding the problem of maneuver tactics is the mal-deployment of United States forces on the least likely avenues of approach into Western Europe. While this latter problem is a result of historical factors rather than conscious choice, it points out the military vulnerability of NATO's political strategy of forward defense.²²

FORCE IMPROVEMENTS

Regardless of how the current "balance" is assessed or what factors are used in its consideration, there clearly has been a change in the force structures of the two alliances since negotiations were commenced in 1973. For its part, the Soviet Union has increased the manpower of its 20 divisions in the Group Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) by some

¹⁹Cliffe, op. cit., pp. 29-34.

²⁰Lawrence and Record, op. cit., p. 31.

²¹Robert L. Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces. Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), pp. 25-28.

²²Collins, op. cit., p. 244.

20 percent, increased the number of tanks in the motorized rifle divisions by 40 percent, and doubled the artillery integral to both its armored and motorized rifle divisions.²³ Additionally, the Soviet force structure has expanded from 140 divisions in 1964 to 168 divisions in 1977.²⁴ Moreover, the Soviets have doubled their numbers of helicopters and markedly increased the numbers of aircraft assigned to frontal aviation units.²⁵

NATO, on the other hand, has also made significant improvements to its forces during this period. In 1976 and 1977, two American mechanized brigades were deployed to West Germany, as well as the doubling of F-111 fighter bomber assets in England.²⁶ NATO forces were also qualitatively updated with the addition of new air defense weapon systems, new and more capable aircraft, and the movement of one U.S. brigade into the northern NATO sector in an attempt to ease the mal-deployment problem.

A BALANCE?

One issue which will be discussed in a later section, but which has an important impact on the balance, concerns the geographical location of two of the major protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union. While the Soviets are located in close proximity to the central region, the United States is located at a great distance. This disparity sparked

²³Joseph A. Pechman, The 1978 Budget: Setting National Priorities (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 106-107.

²⁴The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁵Johan J. Holst and Ewe Nerlich, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims--New Arms (New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1977), p. 272.

²⁶"NATO and the Russians." Christian Science Monitor, May 24, 1978, p. 27.

a lively controversy concerning the mobilization and deployment of reserves into the central front area should it prove necessary. This has had the effect of significantly complicating the computation of any balance in the area. In fact, the International Institute for Strategic Studies has noted that:

The movement of external reinforcements to the theatre and the mobilization of indigenous firstline reserves would materially alter the figures (the balance).... Indeed there is only limited utility in comparing just peacetime strengths, since in crisis or conflict the total combat manpower that can be brought to bear in time becomes the key indicator.²⁷

Given the asymmetries in military postures, force structures, equipment capabilities and mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, it seems unlikely that a balance could be attained which would satisfy both the Soviet goal of "equal security" and the NATO goal of "maintaining the present degree of security at reduced cost."²⁸ Furthermore, the geographical limits of the reduction area itself seems to lessen the relative importance of offensive and defensive capabilities located there, since so many forces can be introduced from outside the area.

²⁷The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 105.

²⁸J.I. Coffey, Arms Control and European Security: A Guide to East-West Negotiations (London: Chatto and Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 137.

While the controversy may not have resulted in agreement on a definition of a balance in the central region, it has resulted in a serious reassessment of the European military balance and exposed some serious defects in NATO force structuring. This reassessment can be credited for NATO's recent concentration on improvements in combat strength, anti-tank weapons and the close air support capability needed for a short-war scenario.²⁹ It would also appear that the Warsaw Pact is reacting to the need to consider a longer war scenario by increasing the capability of its frontal aviation units for interdiction missions. The Carter Administration has responded to the situation by increasing funds for the American commitment to NATO and developing plans for the pre-positioning of more equipment in Europe.³⁰

The inability of the analysts, both military and civilian, to provide an acceptable definition of the balance is pointed out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London:

... a balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact based on comparison of manpower, combat units or equipment is an extraordinarily complex one, acutely difficult to analyze. In the first place the Pact has numerical superiority in some measures, and NATO by others, and there is no fully satisfactory way to compare the asymmetrical advantages. Secondly, qualitative factors that cannot be reduced to numbers (such as training, morale, leadership, tactical initiative and geographical positions) could prove dominant in warfare.³¹

²⁹Jane M.P. Sharp, "MBFR As Arms Control?" Arms Control Today 6, No. 4 (April 1976), p. 1.

³⁰"President Warned Current Balance of Forces Gives no Cause for Complacency," Armed Forces Journal, May 1978, p. 20.

³¹The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 109.

However, the Institute also notes that "... the overall balance is such as to make military aggression appear unattractive."³² This apparent inability to accurately weigh the balance has resulted in a movement in some areas toward other negotiating goals at Vienna. For example, in their 1977 report to Congress, Senators Nunn and Bartlett, after a thorough study of the issues discussed above, and after noting that the negotiations are in their fifth unsuccessful year, stated that "In our view, the manpower disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact ... are not the major NATO Problem."³³ They further noted that the "... main objectives of MBFR should be to reduce the Soviet firepower in the Guidelines Area, to provide the necessary verification means to insure it is not reintroduced, and to take steps which would improve early warning of impending attack."³⁴ This would seem to indicate a movement towards a more political solution to the balance than has previously been the focal point of NATO (or at least The United States). This may also reflect a realization that the Soviet political goals at Vienna are not compatible with the current technical objectives of NATO, and that if progress is to be made NATO's focus must be adjusted. It should also be noted that no real progress has been made at the negotiations in five years, most probably since there has been no real political pressure from the major participants to reach such an agreement.

³²Ibid.

³³U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services: NATO and the New Soviet Threat (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 16.

³⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER III

TECHNOLOGY AND MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION

The use of technology to offset shortcomings in conventional force levels is not a recent occurrence for NATO. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations the United States relied on nuclear technology -- both tactical and strategic -- in developing the strategy of "Massive Retaliation." This technology, however, became increasingly vulnerable following the Soviet development of the hydrogen bomb and the launching of sputnik in 1957. Even though Khrushchev demonstrated the Soviet Union's vulnerability in the Cuban missile crisis, by 1967-1969 the United States and the Soviet Union were essentially at a level of nuclear parity. The French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 allowed the United States to convince NATO to formally adopt the doctrine of "flexible response," which codified strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, and recognized the conventional disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

As was discussed earlier, the period from 1966 forward marked a period during which the United States, because of its involvement in Vietnam, experienced pressures against continued overseas troop deployments. The economic impact of Lyndon Johnson's social programs had caused severe economic problems for the United States beginning in the late 1960's, eventually culminating with Richard Nixon's "New Economic Policy." These domestic and fiscal pressures, plus the requirements of Vietnam,

combined to produce what could be termed a "technological revolution" in weaponry, the results of which were displayed during the Yom Kippur war in 1973. While every period of warfare seems to be accompanied by technological progress, the last three decades have proved to be particularly fertile in this respect. The fruits of this technological revolution could possibly threaten or end the prospects for agreement in Vienna, just as technological innovations in strategic weaponry have complicated the tasks of the negotiators in the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) talks. The argument has been advanced that NATO could use this new technology to accept lower levels of armaments in the reduction zone while still maintaining or even improving its present conventional relationship to Soviet capabilities. As General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated, "The United States has never attempted to match the Soviet Union in either ground force personnel or material, relying instead on technology."¹

THE TECHNOLOGY

The new technological developments deal not only with nuclear weapons, such as enhanced radiation warheads, but with conventional weapons as well. In fact, the possibility exists that a combination of cruise missile and PGM (Precision Guided Munition) technology might in many instances obviate the need for tactical nuclear weapons and thus raise the nuclear threshold in Central Europe.²

¹General George Brown, as quoted in Richard Burt, New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions. Adelphi Paper No. 126 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 1.

²Holst, op. cit., pp. 270-271.

In the past, technological advances have offered an economical means of offsetting the high cost of procuring large quantities of conventional armaments. As technology has progressed, however, it seems that in some instances it has become uneconomical. Studies indicate that increasing technological sophistication may require more and better trained personnel, rather than providing manpower savings.³ Technologically, the most significant advances have occurred in the areas of remote guidance and control; target identification and acquisition; precision guidance; and C³ systems (command, control and communications). The application of this technology to anti-tank guided missiles has led to compelling arguments for the widespread deployment of such weapons as a cheap and cost effective counter to the Warsaw Pact tank threat.⁴ For its part, the Warsaw Pact is already applying significant levels of Soviet technology to ground air defense systems, which has allowed Soviet frontal aviation assets to begin to play a more significant tactical role, rather than continuing to perform strictly air defense missions.

The list of PGMs that have been developed using newly acquired technology is impressive, including on the NATO side such weapons as the AIM-9 air to air missile, the Maverick AGM-65A air to ground guided bomb, the tow anti-tank missile, as well as significant progress in the development of laser-guided Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles (CLGP). The Soviet Union has also demonstrated the ability to apply similar technology in the SA-6 and SA-7 ground to air missiles. While the West

³Burt, op. cit., p. 2.

⁴James F. Digby, Precision Guided Weapons. Adelphi Paper No. 118 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1975), pp. 8-10.

enjoys a lead in this area at the present time, it is unreasonable to believe that the Soviet Union has not already embarked on similar programs. The ability of the Soviet Union to develop and deploy technology ahead of the West's expectations was demonstrated with the testing of their first atomic device in 1949, Sputnik in 1957, and their current level of MIRV technology, which is causing so much distress in the SALT II talks. NATO should therefore be wary of accepting the deployment of precision guided munitions, either those presently deployed or the more sophisticated ones now being tested, as a panacea for conventional inferiority. However, many studies are presently alluding to that suggestion.⁵

THE CRUISE MISSILE PROBLEM

Perhaps one of the most difficult of all recent technologies to cope with is that of the cruise missile. While the technology itself is not particularly new, recent advances have made the system deployable. For the United States, the cruise missile remains primarily a strategic asset, since it is being developed in lieu of the updating of the manned bomber program. However, the cruise missile is expected to be as effective for "tactical" missions as it is in the strategic role. Thus, the cruise missile is seen by European NATO members as a multi-purpose system, combining nuclear and conventional capabilities in one system.

⁵For example, James F. Digby, in Johan J. Holst and Ewe Nerlich, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims-New Arms (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1977); and Kenneth Hunt, The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defence with Fewer Men. Adelphi Paper No. 98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973).

Not only would they be able to use the system for deep penetration and interdiction missions, but it could provide a very cost effective replacement for certain elements of European national nuclear forces nearing obsolescence. The cruise missile problem has proved to be a sensitive issue between the United States and its NATO allies. The Europeans have been concerned that the United States might accept restrictions on the transfer of cruise technology in order to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a SALT II accord.⁶ The Europeans will probably remain concerned in this respect until a SALT II agreement is finally concluded. While the Europeans stand to gain from the technology transfer, it would tend to make them more independent from the United States in the strategic realm, which may or may not be a blessing. Should the European NATO members acquire the cruise missile, however, it would certainly complicate the negotiations at Vienna, since the Soviets would definitely desire to establish some treaty controls if possible, especially if the Federal Republic of Germany were a recipient. Such a situation could also drastically alter the relationship between NATO and the United States. Moreover, the cruise missile issue will remain particularly important for European NATO Members since it provides an affordable means of military counter-pressure against the Soviet Union's conventional and IRBM/MRBM threat, allowing a degree of political independence without sole reliance on the United States' strategic capability.

⁶"Brown to Europe: U.S. Will Keep Cruise Missile," Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 1977, p. 1.

GREY AREA TECHNOLOGY

Perhaps the most important aspect of the new technology is the resulting proliferation of multi-purpose and multi-mission weapons systems, which are both conventional and nuclear capable. The United States' Lance missile and cruise missiles fall into this category, as does much of NATO's tactical air capability.⁷ When MFR proposals include the reduction of tactical nuclear delivery aircraft (such as the NATO 1975 proposal), this reduces the number of aircraft available to SACEUR for conventional air support. There is also the consideration that should these "grey area" weapons progress to the point where conventional munitions could perform missions now assigned to tactical nuclear weapons, the "linkage" between tactical nuclear weapons and the American strategic deterrent might be lost. Should this occur, it might make the threat of a conventional conflict in Europe more likely (thus increasing the political leverage of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces), while raising the nuclear threshold. It is doubtful that many European NATO members would really support such a policy. Tactical nuclear weapons still continue to serve the purpose of maintaining the ambiguity facing Soviet planners, thus enhancing deterrence.⁸

⁷Christoph Bertram, The Future of Arms Control: Part I: Beyond SALT II. Adelphi Paper No. 141 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1978), p. 25.

⁸Burt, op. cit., p. 23.

NATO-WARSAW PACT PERCEPTIONS

It has long been accepted by NATO, and apparently by the Warsaw Pact as well, that the West enjoys a technological lead in most areas. This argument has been a consistent part of the claim by NATO Planners that equality in capabilities exists, for example, between NATO air forces and those of the Warsaw Pact. This view was expounded in 1974 during a major Western conference on SALT and MBFR:

These differences (Warsaw Pact superiority in total manpower, number of tanks and aircraft deployed in the central region) are offset ... by the NATO country's superiority in the mobility of their ground forces and number of helicopters, the performance of their tactical fighters, and the delivery accuracy of their munitions.⁹

This argument was reinforced in a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Senator Sam Nunn, which stated that "In the long term, the quantum jump in NATO firepower necessary to counter the new Soviet threat can be obtained only by accelerated exploitation of ongoing technological advances in munitions and delivery systems."¹⁰ This statement followed the recognition, in the same report, that the terrain and high incidence of inclement weather conditions of Central Europe make it highly suspect that these weapons will perform as well as they did on Middle Eastern battlefields.¹¹

⁹"SALT and MBFR: The Next Phase: Report of a Trilateral Conference." Survival (January/February 1975), p. 21.

¹⁰Nunn and Bartlett, op. cit., p. 20.

¹¹Ibid., p. 11.

The large number of research and development programs underway in the United States, Europe and Soviet Union attest to the perception by all sides that technological advances are the key to future success on the battlefield. However, as was noted above, there is no guarantee that these weapons will provide the advantages anticipated. For example, NATO air forces will not be operating in a permissive air defense environment, nor can NATO anti-tank gunners expect to be able to employ their weapons without receiving suppressive artillery fire from opposing forces.

Additionally, it may soon be economically infeasible for the West to continue to maintain the current technological lead. The relatively small defense budgets of most NATO members will make it increasingly difficult for them to finance even a straight forward replacement program. These economic pressures on research and development programs played a significant role in the establishment of Eurogroup. Moreover, the increasing sophistication of military equipment, especially in the aerospace field, may preclude national production of sophisticated equipment by European nations.

The Soviet Union considered one such technological development, the enhanced radiation warhead, to be of major importance. Soviet delegates at the Vienna negotiations apparently feared that NATO would introduce the cruise missile and "neutron" warhead as bargaining chips in the negotiations.¹² Even though President Carter later decided to defer

¹²"Soviets Warn NATO Over Bargaining on Troop Cut," Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1977, p. 5.

production of enhanced radiation weapons, the Soviet interest in its non-development indicates their apprehension over the technology.

THE IMPACT ON MFR

At present, the impact of technology on the MFR negotiations is somewhat limited. The impact of PGMs and other developments on a similar level will be felt primarily through concessions the respective alliances feel they could make because of increased capabilities. The cruise missile and other "grey area" issues have not yet been felt at Vienna since they are still being dealt with at the SALT Negotiations. Should the Soviets be unable to control the cruise missile under a SALT accord, however, the issue will most certainly be raised in Vienna. If these issues do arise in Vienna, they would also have to encompass the theater/tactical nuclear forces of both sides, including those systems based in the Western Soviet Union,

The continued introduction of new weapons technologies will continue to create uncertainties and make it more difficult to arrive at reduction formulas that will adequately reflect the asymmetrical structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While this new technology may increase internal alliance security, it will not aid in arriving at an acceptable force reductions formula in Vienna.

CHAPTER IV

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The nuclear balance, both strategic and tactical, will play a key role in the future of the MFR talks, since the negotiations are being conducted within the context of the overall United States - Soviet Union strategic balance. Tactical nuclear weapons have become an important issue because they are a basic factor in NATO's defensive strategy, and because of their introduction into the negotiations by the United States in 1975.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC BALANCE

The change in the strategic nuclear balance that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 began to be seriously appreciated during the 1966-69 time frame. During this period, the Soviet Union increased its inventory of land based ICBMs from approximately 190 in 1964¹ to 730 in 1967, with the end of 1968 marking the achievement of rough parity in hardened ICBMs.² This change in the strategic balance most probably provided the confidence necessary for continued Soviet arms control talks with the United States.

¹Blechman, op. cit., p. 8.

²Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 116.

However, Soviet motives in entering into negotiations were quite different than those of the United States, as was clearly illustrated by the continued expansion of Soviet strategic forces subsequent to the SALT I accords.³ There is no indication that the Soviets have slowed their attempts to reach a more favorable "correlation of forces" vis-a-vis the West. In fact, many analysts contend that the Soviets are still attempting to attain strategic superiority over the United States. This contention, in fact, forms the basis of the debate in the United States over the viability of the Carter Administration's SALT II proposals.

As was discussed in Chapter One, the domestic pressures against American commitments overseas, combined with Soviet desires and needs to ease the level of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, produced what is now termed detente. While detente provided the political context necessary for the convening of SALT I, CSCE and the MFR talks, it did not necessarily alter the objectives of any of the participants.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF CONVENTIONAL DOCTRINE

The legacy of the Eisenhower Administration's "New Look" defense policy still holds the NATO position at the MFR talks hostage. Tactical nuclear weapons were introduced into NATO forces as a result of the postwar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the shock of the Korean invasion, and the inability of NATO to establish a conventional force structure sufficient to balance the Soviet threat.

³Colin S. Cray, "A Problem Guide to SALT II," Survival (September/October 1975), p. 234.

The solution to NATO's inferiority, proposed by the United States, was a new strategy based on nuclear weapons, with United States strategic forces providing a long-range deterrent to developing Soviet capabilities, while tactical nuclear weapons would reinforce local defense needs.⁴

This doctrine was codified by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech in January 1954, which established that future defense policies would "... depend primarily on a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."⁵ This speech established what was to be called the "New Look" defense policy, and defined a strategic doctrine termed "Massive Retaliation." The most important element in this strategy, at least for the Europeans, was the direct linkage between tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the American strategic deterrent force.

The Europeans were satisfied with the "New Look" strategy, which provided a significant number of American troops on the continent to reinforce the American commitment to Europe, and a nuclear strategy which seemed to preclude the possibility of a protracted land war on NATO territory.⁶ However, the United States' view on the role of tactical nuclear weapons soon diverged from that of the European NATO members.

⁴Kahan, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵New York Times, November 30, 1954, p. 13.

⁶William C. Cromwell, ed., Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership (Bruges: College of Europe, 1969), p. 46.

While the Europeans considered NATO nuclear doctrine to be primarily a deterrent, the United States tended to view nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, as being used in defense of Europe should deterrence fail. That is, American ground forces, and those of our allies, would serve primarily as a "trip wire," the crossing of which would result in a massive nuclear response, including tactical nuclear weapons.⁷ To a great extent, this difference of opinion still exists in the NATO doctrine of the 70's, and was evidenced by the differing NATO responses to Secretary Kissinger's 1975 proposal to reduce American tactical nuclear stockpiles in Europe in exchange for Soviet concessions in Vienna. The West German response to this proposal conceded that "... 7,000 warheads is not a magic number,"⁸ but in a later speech, former West German Chief of Staff, General Ulrich de Maiziere, presented what has been interpreted as the official West German response: "It will not be feasible to make a considerable change in the number of nuclear weapons stored in Europe."⁹

While "flexible response" has taken over from "massive retaliation" as the operative NATO strategic doctrine, the Europeans still seem to retain their original attitudes towards American tactical nuclear weapons. The adoption of "flexible response" was opposed by the European NATO members because they feared a "de-coupling" of the American strategic

⁷Dennis M. Gormley, "NATO's Tactical Nuclear Option: Past, Present and Future," Military Review 53 (September 1973), p. 5.

⁸Walter F. Hahn, Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views. Foreign Policy Papers, Vol. 1, No. 3. (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1975), p. 63.

⁹Ibid.

guarantee from Europe. It is clear that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons is closely intertwined with the American strategic deterrent, at least as it is associated with NATO, and that tactical nuclear weapons form a basic element of the NATO defensive posture. Because of the close relation between tactical and strategic nuclear doctrine on the NATO side, and because of the increasing number of multi-purpose conventional weapons (Lance, dual-mission tactical aircraft, nuclear capable artillery, and the cruise missile), it will become increasingly more difficult to differentiate between strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional capable system.

It appears, however, that this problem is much more advanced in NATO than in the Warsaw Pact. The Pact's position is much simpler than that of NATO, since Soviet doctrine does not really differentiate between strategic or tactical nuclear forces, subsuming them all under one doctrine encompassing a "correlation of forces." The Soviets do, however, have significant number of IRBMs and MRBMs which can strike Western Europe. Many of these systems were originally developed in an effort to offset American strategic superiority in the late 50's and early 60's, although they are continuing with the deployment of the new mobile SS-20 missile.¹⁰ The Soviet force structure does not suffer from the plethora of dual-capable systems that causes NATO so much difficulty although they do have many of the same capabilities. Thus, the Soviets do not have to contend at Vienna with the artificiality between strategic and tactical capabilities

¹⁰ Bertram, op. cit., p. 28.

which have been introduced by NATO's strategic doctrine.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR STRATEGIES

As has been noted above, tactical nuclear weapons now form a basic element in NATO's conventional balance against the Warsaw Pact. The differing views on their use will certainly complicate the negotiations at Vienna. The United States' tactical nuclear strategy tends to fix itself on deterrence by denial, which translates into defense (by making it impossible for an opponent to achieve his military and political objectives). This perspective would argue for retention of nuclear weapons, such as artillery fired projectiles, which can be used in the actual defense of NATO terrain. The European NATO members, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, prefer deterrence by punishment, which implies a threat to destroy an opponent's homeland.¹¹ To a great extent, this explains the reluctance of West Germany to see F-4's, which are capable of performing the deep interdiction strikes implied by deterrence by punishment, and Pershing missiles included in the United States' 1975 proposal at Vienna.

The American tendency towards "war fighting" is illustrated by those strategists who hypothesize that "... if warhead delivery systems were limited to accurate tube artillery, geography held to the actual area of penetration, weapon effects limited to clean air bursts ... This solution could clearly save the immediate military situation ... unless the situation

¹¹Wolfgang Heisenberg, The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons. Adelphi Paper No. 96 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1973), p. 5.

is badly misread by the highest Soviet authorities."¹² This school is perhaps better known by their adherence to the so-called "mini-nuke" strategy, which clearly propounds a reliance on a strategy designed to decouple U.S. strategic forces from the initial stages of conflict, and an attempt to defeat the enemy through the battlefield use of "clean" nuclear weapons.¹³ The reasons for the German rejection of this strategy were clearly illustrated by Georg Leber when he noted that "... 30 percent of our population and 25 percent of our industrial capacity are situated in a zone 100 kilometers directly adjacent to the Federal Republic's border with the Warsaw Pact."¹⁴ Thus, there is a definite ambiguity over the actual role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO, which is not explained in any NATO document.

FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS

This doctrinal ambiguity was most clearly demonstrated by the response of the European NATO members towards the fate of both Forward Based Systems (nuclear capable aircraft and long range SSMS) and the cruise missile in the SALT I and II negotiations. Both the FBS and cruise missile systems have the inherent capabilities which lend them to use as a "shot across the bow" nuclear warning in case of hostilities. They also serve to move NATO to a "quick linkage" posture, thereby engaging the United States' strategic nuclear systems.¹⁵ Moreover,

¹²James H. Polk, "The Realities of Tactical Nuclear Warfare," Orbis XVII (Summer 1973), p. 444.

¹³Lawrence Martin, "Theater Nuclear Weapons and Europe," Survival XVI (November/December 1974), p. 270.

¹⁴Georg Leber, "Principles Underlying German Defense Policy," The Atlantic Community Quarterly III (Summer 1976), p. 219.

¹⁵David N. Schwartz, "The Role of Deterrence in NATO Defense Strategy," World Politics 28 (October 1975), pp. 122-123.

the possession of these systems (FBS), and even more significantly the possession of cruise missiles, would provide European NATO members with a form of political leverage against Soviet pressure in Western Europe. Additionally, these systems are visible signs of the American commitment to the defense and security of Western Europe.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MFR

The complex interrelationships between weapons and strategy in NATO has already caused some problems. The conflict between the United States and European NATO members over American attempts to solve the Backfire bomber issue in SALT II without compromising the status of cruise missiles and forward based systems is a prime example. On one hand the Carter Administration is being pressured by conservative interest groups to bring the Backfire bomber under control, while NATO demands that the cruise missile remain free from restrictions.¹⁶ This situation has already placed the United States in a position where its interests in achieving a SALT II accord are in conflict with the desires of its NATO partners. Should the cruise missile issue not be resolved in the SALT forum, it will most certainly further complicate the negotiations in Vienna.

The efforts of NATO to achieve a reduction formula at Vienna appear destined to continue to be complicated by the political and military considerations of the tactical nuclear issue. The European NATO members will attempt not to sacrifice any significant nuclear capability, since

¹⁶"Allies Urge U.S. Not to Bargain Away Cruise Missile," Los Angeles Times, October 13, 1977, p. 12.

they still see these systems as a political guarantee: "The nuclear capability of NATO which is integrated in the conventional forces is above all the link between the conventional forces in Europe and the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States."¹⁷ The Warsaw Pact could be expected to continue to be interested in the reduction of these weapons for essentially the same reason, although they have specifically rejected the idea of a cancellation of neutron warhead production by the United States as a bargaining chip at Vienna.

For NATO there appears to be no way to separate the strategic and tactical nuclear issues from the conventional balance in Central Europe. Former Secretary Schlesinger firmly tied the United States' strategic forces to the balance with his "limited counterforce" doctrine of 1974-75.¹⁸ While this doctrine might be seen simply as an attempt to reassure the European NATO allies of the credibility of the American strategic deterrent in a period of Soviet-American parity, the strategic - conventional link was nonetheless firmly established. For the European members of NATO, "... nuclear weapons in the alliance have assumed a certain symbolic, talismanic quality. They have become the primary carriers of the message about American commitment and protection, and are usually perceived as the critical links in the chain of deterrence."¹⁹ Given this interrelationship,

¹⁷"Principles of German Defense Policy," *The Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 12. Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, November 11, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁸Ranger, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

¹⁹Holst, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

should the participants at Vienna ever seriously begin negotiations, the nuclear issue will be of paramount importance, both from a military and a political perspective. However, the threat of the proliferation of tactical nuclear systems in and around the reduction area, and the inability to handle them in the MBFR forum, may obviate the very reason for holding the talks themselves.

CHAPTER V
THE PROPOSALS

Preliminary negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on mutual force reductions were initiated on January 31, 1973, and were concluded five months later with a decision to begin official negotiations in October of 1973. The exploratory talks established which members of each respective alliance would be direct participants, and those which would be indirect or special participants. The objectives of the negotiations were outlined by the chief negotiators for the two alliances during the opening session. United States Ambassador Stanley R. Resor defined the Western position as the attainment of "... a more stable military balance in Central Europe at lower levels of forces with undiminished security for each party...."¹ The second principle was outlined by the Soviet Chief Delegate Oleg N. Khlestov during his initial statement on the negotiations: "While doing this (negotiating force reductions) the security of any one side should not suffer nor should any one of them gain an advantage at the expense of the other."²

¹Stanley R. Resor, as quoted in U.S. Congress, Senate, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs: After the War: European Security and the Middle East (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 35.

²Ibid., p. 36.

INITIAL DISCUSSIONS

The final communique closing the exploratory talks referred to the talks as the "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe."³ This represented a defeat for the West which had wanted the title to be designated "mutual and balanced force reductions," which would have implied reductions to a common force level by both sides. The two blocs also disagreed over the geographical area of reductions, with the West demanding the inclusion of Hungary because of the Soviet units stationed there, while the Warsaw Pact demurred. A compromise was reached which excluded Hungary from the reduction area, with NATO reserving its option to reopen the question at a later time.

INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

The NATO position on the force reduction issue was established at NATO conferences at Reykjavik in 1968 and in Rome in 1970. The agreed upon reduction principles were summarized by the Rome communique as follows:

- (1) mutual force reductions must be compatible with the vital security interests of the Alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations;
- (2) reductions should be on a basis of reciprocity, and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing;
- (3) reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned;
- (4) there must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions.⁴

³SIPRI, op. cit., p. 21.

⁴Texts of Final Communiques 1949-1974 (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1975), pp. 233-238.

The basic principles of the Warsaw Pact's approach to the MFR talks are summarized as follows:

- (1) the principle of parity reduction was to be the basis for any reductions;⁵
- (2) reductions must not impair the security of any of the parties;
- (3) all foreign troops and national armed forces and armaments in the reduction area must be subject to reduction.⁶

On the surface, the positions of the two alliances are not too far distant. However, the initial and subsequent proposals of the two alliances provide a fairly comprehensive analysis of the underlying differences.

THE INITIAL WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL

The first proposal presented for consideration was put forward by the Warsaw Pact on 8 November 1973. This draft accord proposed equal reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact which would have amounted to roughly 16 percent. The actual proposal would have resulted in a three stage reduction, beginning with a cut of 20,000 troops on each side. The reductions to be made "... by each state within the overall figure of 20,000 would be in proportion to the number of troops which each state has in the central European area."⁷ A second stage reduction, to be carried out in 1976, envisaged a further reduction of armed forces and armaments of 5 percent by each of the eleven direct participants. Stage three was to be completed in 1977, with a further reduction of 10 percent according

⁵Yu. Kostko, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe," Survival XIV (September/October 1972), p. 238.

⁶Oleg N. Khlestov, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe," Survival XVI (November/December 1974), p. 394.

⁷Ibid., p. 294.

to the criteria in stage two.⁸ Most importantly, reductions were to be carried out in complete military units, with a special protocol designating which units would be reduced. The proposal further stated that all land and air forces and nuclear delivery units would also be subject to the proposal, and that foreign troops subject to an agreement would be returned to within their own borders (along with their equipment); while indigenous units would be disbanded altogether. Furthermore, once the reduction had commenced the participants could not increase the numerical strength of their forces within the area.⁹

NATO'S INITIAL PROPOSAL

NATO's initial proposal followed the Warsaw Pact's plan by two weeks, and was less specific than the Pact's proposal. Basically, the NATO plan called for a reduction of ground forces within the reduction area to a common ceiling of 700,000, to be reached in two phases.¹⁰ The first phase would have resulted in a reduction by the United States of 29,000 men, while the Soviets would reduce their forces by 68,000 men, including a tank army and its associated equipment (1,700 tanks).¹¹ Additional reductions were to be made in Phase II to arrive at a common ceiling of 700,000 troops. However, no specific measures were proposed to deal with the Phase II reductions.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰"Equal Force Levels Pressed by U.S.," The Washington Post, November 1, 1973, p. 1.

¹¹Steven Canby, "Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective," International Security 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), p. 122.

Thus, the initial proposals of the two alliances were substantially at odds. The NATO proposal was obviously directed at reducing NATO's inferiority in men and tanks, while the Warsaw Pact's proposal was just as clearly directed at maintaining the status quo, only at a lower level. The initial proposals established several important points of disagreement which can be summarized as follows:

(1) the NATO proposal indicated that an imbalance in forces existed between the two alliances; the Warsaw Pact proposal indicated that an adequate balance already existed;

(2) the NATO Proposal called for a collective ceiling, which would not limit any particular national force as long as the alliance total of 700,000 was not exceeded; the Warsaw Pact proposal would have established national ceilings for each of the eleven direct participants;

(3) the NATO Proposal would have resulted in greater reductions in American forces, while the Warsaw Pact proposal would have resulted in greater reductions to European NATO forces.

Neither of these proposals was acceptable to the other alliance, and no real movement on the issues occurred. NATO offered a second proposal on December 16, 1975, which modified its original plan by offering the withdrawal of 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing missiles, provided the Warsaw Pact would accept the principle of collective ceilings and the reduction of the original requirement of 68,000 men and one tank army.¹² The Warsaw Pact rejected this offer as "insufficient" on 30 January 1976.¹³

THE SECOND ROUND

The Warsaw Pact countered with its second proposal in February 1976. This proposal was based on a two stage reduction plan (a concession to

¹²Canby, op. cit., p. 122.

¹³Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1976, p. 3.

NATO), with only the United States and the Soviet Union involved in the first phase. The basic provisions of the proposal are shown below:

Phase I (1976)

(1) Soviet and American troops are reduced by 2 or 3 percent of each side's total troop strength;

(2) one corps headquarters, 300 tanks, 54 nuclear capable F-4's and SU 17/20 aircraft and 36 Pershing and Scud-E missile systems are removed from each side respectively;

(3) the removal of some associated nuclear warheads and an unspecified number of air defense missiles;

Phase II (1977)

(1) a freeze is placed on personnel and equipment by all parties;

(2) in 1978 all direct participants would reduce their forces by an equal percentage to be negotiated at a later date.¹⁴

Just as the NATO proposal of 1975 failed to satisfy the Warsaw Pact, this proposal failed to compromise on the issues that were felt to be critical by NATO. The arms talks became stalemated after NATO's rejection of this plan, primarily over the "data" issue, which refers to the inability of the two sides to agree on the number of troops the Warsaw Pact has stationed in the reduction area. NATO estimates indicate the Warsaw Pact strength in the area to be approximately 965,000 not including air force personnel,¹⁵ while the Warsaw Pact figures, tabled in Vienna on 10 June 1976, indicated that the Pact had only 805,000 ground troops in the reduction area.¹⁶ Had

¹⁴Prendergast, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁵"Troop Strength Numbers Game at Issue as NATO, Warsaw Pact Talks Resume," Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1977, p. 19.

¹⁶Ibid.

the Warsaw Pact "data" been accepted, no requirement for asymmetrical reductions would have existed. NATO did not accept these figures at face value, however, and the talks were again stalled until April 1978, when NATO tabled its third proposal.

The latest NATO proposal dismissed the requirement that the Soviet withdraw a complete tank army, instead simply requiring that 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks be withdrawn from Soviet units stationed in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Additionally, NATO agreed to establish specific numbers of troop reductions for Britain, Belgium, Canada, West Germany, Holland and Luxembourg during the second phase.¹⁷ However, this plan was contingent on the Warsaw Pact's acceptance of the Western demand for parity (the common 700,000 man ceiling for each sides). This proposal was presented just prior to the scheduled adjournment of the talks, so no Soviet response has been received. However, Leonid Brezhnev did indicate in June 1978 that the Warsaw Pact might be willing to discuss the Western demand for asymmetrical reductions.¹⁸ Should this prove to be a serious proposal and not simply an attempt by Brezhnev to trade a small concession at Vienna for a larger return in the SALT negotiations, it might prove significant.

¹⁷"NATO Drafts a Proposal for East - West Troop Cuts," Christian Science Monitor, April 17, 1978, p. 3.

¹⁸U.S. News and World Report, June 26, 1978, p. 8.

While the two alliances remain far apart in their orientations, these recent concessions may be indicative that some movement is in the offing. An analysis of the issues behind the proposals, however, is necessary to fully understand the current status of the negotiations.

CHAPTER VI

THE MAJOR ISSUES

The prospects for reaching an agreement between the two alliances at Vienna, and indeed among the alliance members themselves, are dependent upon their ability and desire to compromise on the issues raised by their proposals. The major issue areas were highlighted in the previous chapter during the discussion of the proposals.

COLLECTIVITY AND PARITY

NATO-Warsaw Pact disagreement revolves primarily around two basic issues: "collectivity" and "parity." The principle of parity refers to the reduction of military forces on both sides to a common ceiling. This principle was proposed by NATO in its first proposal and has not been subsequently modified. The significance of parity is that it assumes that a balance does not presently exist in Central Europe, and that the Warsaw Pact should therefore make proportionately larger reductions. For its part, the Warsaw Pact has consistently refused to accept the principle of parity, and has instead pointed out that a balance of some sort has evolved during the past three decades since no conflict has erupted in Central Europe.¹

¹V. Komlev, "Four Years of the Vienna Talks," Mirovaya Ekonomika, November 1, 1977, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vol. III, No. 240, Annex No. 95, December 14, 1977, pp. 1-12.

The second fundamental issue -- that of collectivity -- is just as significant for both sides as the issue of parity. The NATO position proposed that each alliance be required to reduce its ground forces to a common ceiling, but that within the agreed limits each alliance would be free to establish national ceilings as it desired. This would, of course, allow flexibility in the force structure and, more important, allow one or more members to increase their forces to offset a unilateral reduction by another member. The Warsaw Pact position has continued to be that each participant be required to reduce its forces by a certain percentage which, in conjunction with the provision precluding increases in forces subsequent to the initiation of reductions, would have the effect of establishing national ceilings on each participant. The question of "common ceilings" versus "national ceilings" illustrates the Soviet Union's attempt to place a legal ceiling on the Bundeswehr, while NATO attempts to foreclose this option. The Soviet attempt to control West Germany's armed forces is further magnified by the geo-political makeup of the reduction area which, although it technically includes the Benelux countries as well, tends to concentrate the negotiations against a single country (the FRG) on the Western side.²

THE FORCES PROBLEM

As was noted earlier, the basic NATO proposal was designed to achieve reductions in ground forces only. The objective being to reach a common

²Alex Horhager, "The MBFR Talks - Problems and Prospects," International Defense Review 9, No. 2 (April 1976): p. 189.

ceiling on ground forces and to reduce the large disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact tank forces. The proposal concentrated on tank forces because they have been the most effective ground offensive weapons systems in recent experience. Such a proposal, if accepted, would allow NATO to continue to apply its superior technology in other weapons systems, especially in tactical aviation systems, to offset any remaining disparities in combat capabilities. The Warsaw Pact position, naturally enough, rejected this approach, pointing out that all branches of armed forces and their associated weapons should be subject to reduction since they each form part of an integral combined arms concept. The Warsaw Pact would have benefited from this arrangement since reductions in NATO tactical air forces and in other NATO technologically superior weapons systems would have reduced NATO's ability to compensate for numerical inferiority through technology. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact's proposal was designed to insure the continuation of the status quo, thus giving their interpretation of NATO's principle of "undiminished security for each party." The forces issue has yet to be resolved, although the NATO presentation of its Option III proposal in 1975 did include the reduction of some tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The forces issue is likely to remain a problem in the negotiations, at least until one or both of the sides alters its negotiating goals.

OTHER ISSUES

In addition to the above problem areas, NATO and the Warsaw Pact disagree on other issues, one of which concerns the phasing of the

reductions. As was noted in the previous chapter, NATO proposed that force reductions take place in two phases, the first involving only the Soviet Union and the United States, with the second including the remaining direct participants. The Warsaw Pact, however, has pressed for a more rigid schedule, proposing that all direct participants plainly state when and what would be reduced in the second stage. In essence, NATO proposed to negotiate in two phases, not necessarily guaranteeing a second phase agreement; the Warsaw Pact position would establish all reduction quotas in the initial agreement and simply execute it in two phases.³ This represents quite a different stance by each side.

Along with the phasing problem, verification represents another issue that has not yet been solved. Although the West has attempted to raise the issue on several occasions, Warsaw Pact negotiators have refused to discuss the matter. It would seem logical to expect the Soviets to adopt a position on this issue similar to that which they have adhered to in the past at the SALT negotiations; a rejection of intrusive inspection procedures and a reliance on national means of verification. While the verification problem can be avoided at present, it will become more sensitive the closer the two sides move towards a possible agreement.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL PROBLEM

One of the most contentious issues, and one that has tended to preoccupy the West the most, is the geographical issue. The West has adopted the view that the Soviet Union derives unique advantages

³Prendergast, op. cit., p. 33.

because of its proximity to the reduction area. According to the West, Western Russia can serve as a staging area for moving reinforcements into the reduction area, or could also serve as a holding area for Soviet troops withdrawn as a result of a reductions agreement.⁴ This is in contrast to the United States which is located some 3,000 miles distant and must airlift or sealift troops to the central front. While the Soviets have rejected the geographical question as being a legitimate point of discussion,⁵ the problem has generated a great deal of study and discussion on the subject in the West, and may have been instrumental in changing the focus toward the negotiations for the West. As was noted earlier, the ability of both sides to rapidly deploy additional troops and air units to the reduction area may obviate, to a great extent, the proposed reductions.

THE DATA ISSUE

Perhaps the most important disagreement in the negotiations at present, at least the one that has delayed substantive discussions the longest, concerns the number of forces stationed in the reduction area by the two alliances. Initial NATO estimates placed Warsaw Pact troops in the reduction area at approximately 935,000, not including air force personnel.⁶ Similar estimates of NATO forces indicated a total deployment in the area of 770,000.⁷ These figures provided much of the justification,

⁴V. Komlev, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

⁵Khlestov, op. cit., pp. 294-295.

⁶"West Questions Soviet Figures on Troops," The Washington Star, June 17, 1976, p. 4.

⁷Ibid.

along with the geographical question, for the asymmetrical reductions proposed by the West. The Warsaw Pact refused to submit its own figures until June 1976, when it placed Warsaw Pact group troop strength in the reduction area at 805,000.⁸ Should NATO accept these figures, then the ground forces of the two alliances would already be in rough parity (which is the Warsaw Pact's contention), thus reducing NATO's argument for asymmetrical reductions. However, NATO delegates believe that the Warsaw Pact has reduced its figures to 805,000 by excluding supply personnel, logistical support troops, military police and various other categories of personnel.⁹

NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES

The inability of the two sides to agree on the figures to be used to initiate the negotiations returns the discussion to the objectives of the participants. The Warsaw Pact position was clearly stated at the beginning of the talks by Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak:

The realistic approach to the problem of mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe requires that it be carried out with due respect to the existing relationship of forces, which satisfies the objective needs of European security. Our understanding of the principle of undiminished security is that, while lowering the level of forces and armaments, this relationship of forces should be maintained.¹⁰

⁸Prendergast, op. cit., p. 35.

⁹Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1977, p. 19.

¹⁰Tadeusz Strulak, as quoted in Prendergast, op. cit., p. 37.

This statement explains much of the disagreement between the two sides during the exploratory talks over the inclusion of the word "balanced" in the title of the negotiations. The Warsaw Pact has continued to stress the fact that the negotiations must be conducted in accordance with the principle of "... non-detriment to the security of any of the sides...."¹¹ In essence, Pact proposals and negotiating objectives remain the preservation of the status quo.

For NATO, however, a number of studies and statements indicate that a subtle shift in thinking may be underway. Although NATO's official proposals still indicate a concentration on the imbalance in manpower and tanks in the reduction area, some studies indicate a realization that technological innovations on both sides may "... make any concessions that NATO would seem to gain, even by a very asymmetrical force reduction, something of a mirage."¹² Statements by Senator Nunn in 1977 indicate that this feeling has also reached the United States. Much of this change in attitude has been caused by the intensive analysis of factors presented in chapters two and three, that it may not be possible to define what would constitute a balance in Central Europe and, further, that technological developments may in fact make it impossible to deal with the asymmetrical force structures of the two alliances.

¹¹V. Komlev, op. cit., p. 1.

¹²Axel Horhagel, op. cit., p. 192.

CHAPTER VII
THE POLITICS OF MFR

In addition to the military and technical aspects of the negotiations, the MFR talks are above all else an expression of the political realities that exist in and between the two alliances. Unlike the SALT negotiations which are essentially bilateral talks, the MFR discussions include the members of both alliances and, presumably, the desires and demands of the lesser members are somehow expressed in the outcome. Since the discussions on the military aspects of MFR have thus far failed to yield any significant results, it appears reasonable to search for political motives that have possibly impeded the progress. In dealing with the political issues of MFR, however, it must be remembered that, regardless of the desires of NATO, the Soviet Union is situated in Europe and no arms control arrangement or force reduction plan can reduce the super-power status and the accompanying military and political presence of Soviet diplomacy.

THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Warner Schilling astutely defined the essential political dilemma of the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union from the late 1960's in the following question, "How can the United States achieve detente with the Soviet Union except by acquiescing in a divided Europe, but how can Western Europe achieve a detente with Eastern Europe except

by breaking down that division?"¹ This dilemma has remained an essential ingredient in the United States' relations with its NATO allies since detente began to develop following the Cuban missile crisis. It also touched directly on the most sensitive issue for European NATO; a fear of a superpower condominium between the United States and the Soviet Union.

American interest in arms control began in earnest under the Kennedy Administration when Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense. The realization of the costs involved with the development and deployment of an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) system prompted the beginning of a serious desire for an arms control accord with the Soviets. Even though the United States and the Soviet Union reached other agreements following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, no serious arms control talks were launched until the Nixon Administration entered office in 1969. The second Johnson Administration, however, provided support for the initiation of such talks because of its involvement of American forces in Vietnam and its inflationary economic policies. These pressures combined to produce the first Mansfield Amendment in 1966 (callings for reductions in American troop strength overseas), which was reintroduced annually with amazing regularity. In fact, the Mansfield Amendment of 1973 was actually approved by a vote of 49-46 before it was repealed in a quickly called second vote.² The economic impact of Richard Nixon's "New Economic

¹Warner R. Schilling, et. al., American Arms and a Changing Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 3.

²Christian Science Monitor, February 20, 1974, p. 1.

Policy" resulted in continued Congressional pressures for the reduction of American troops overseas. President Nixon was determined, however, not to reduce American commitments except "... through reciprocal reductions negotiated with the Warsaw Pact."³

THE EUROPEAN CONNECTION

American and European interests in arms control began to seriously interact in conjunction with the shift in the strategic nuclear balance away from American superiority. The initiation of Soviet-American strategic arms talks in 1969 reaffirmed French beliefs that the United States could not be trusted to guarantee the security of Europe. President Pompidou continued the previous policy orientations of de Gaulle, preferring political accords between East and West instead of arms control agreements such as MFR and SALT.⁴ Pompidou feared that the MFR negotiations would ultimately undermine the security of the West and lead to the military neutralization of Germany under the control of either the United States or the Soviet Union.⁵ For these reasons, the French government declined to participate in the negotiations, as it still does today.

The present French government, under President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, did make some overtures towards closer ties with NATO in 1977, but the adverse reaction from both the Left and the Gaullist majority prompted a conciliatory response from Premier Raymond Barre. In an address at Camp de Mailly in June of 1977, Barre reiterated that while "... it must

³U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972, p. 44.

⁴Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Politics under De Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 151.

⁵Ibid., p. 158.

be quite clear that France belongs to the Atlantic Alliance ... France withdrew from the integrated organization of NATO, and it must be understood once and for all that we will not go back to that organization, now or in the future."⁶ With this degree of domestic opposition, it is unlikely that the French government will alter its position, even though the two French divisions stationed in Germany are a subject of controversy at Vienna.

The British were also initially opposed to the idea of conducting force reduction negotiations with the Soviets. Initial observations of the British view indicated that having just made their commitment to Europe, they were unwilling to see the Soviets provided with an opportunity to extend their influence.⁷ However, these feelings were later subordinated to the desire to preclude unilateral American force reductions.

The Federal Republic of Germany initially experienced ambivalent feelings about the MFR proposal. While they were still deeply suspicious of ultimate Soviet intentions, the possibility of MFR talks seemed to fit in well with the ostpolitik of the Brandt government.⁸ However, the possibility of American force reductions in Europe, even under the auspices of mutual reductions, placed the West German government in a difficult position. While the possibility of force reductions may have helped smooth the way for Chancellor Brandt's ostpolitik and the treaties of 1970-72,

⁶Raymond Barre, "Address at Camp de Mailly - 18 June 1977," French Embassy: Press and Information Division, pp. 2-3.

⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate: Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 12.

⁸Ibid.

American forces in Europe still remained West Germany's ultimate guarantee for survival. Thus, it seems likely that German acquiescence in the proposal reflected as much a desire to halt any possibility of American unilateral action as it did an earnest support for MFR.

The NATO flank countries -- Turkey, Greece, Norway and Italy -- were concerned that any forces removed from the central region as a result of the negotiations would simply be transferred to their respective areas.⁹ A European observer has noted that for the European NATO members "... MBFR was intended to serve the same purpose that clinging to massive retaliation doctrines had served only a few years earlier ... to secure U.S. force levels."¹⁰ Moreover, MFR seemed like a good idea only as long as the United States did not seriously pursue it.¹¹

From mid-1971 on, the United States became the major NATO proponent behind MFR and apparently provided the dominant influence over the development of proposals and the timing of their introduction,¹² at least until recently. Moreover, Senate views on American forces overseas began to change during the period from 1973 to 1975. Senate sympathies shifted away from support of the Mansfield position, largely because of the end of direct American involvement in Vietnam, which left the United States free to concentrate on the defense of Western Europe.¹³ However, even

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Holst, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Prendergast, op. cit., p. 55.

¹³Ranger, op. cit., p. 96.

though the motives and initial responses to MFR by the NATO members varied, intra-alliance cooperation has been the rule since the beginning of negotiations. German agreement to the 1975 "option III" proposal is a good example, although the German government was initially reluctant on that issue.

WARSAW PACT POLITICS

It is extremely difficult to separate out Eastern European desires from those of the Soviet Union, but because of the power relationship they can be treated as synonymous. As was noted earlier, the Soviet Union was not really interested in convening a forum to discuss force reductions in Central Europe. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet Foreign policy was primarily directed at reestablishing the fabric of detente and effectively responding to the openings offered by Chancellor Brandt's ostpolitik.¹⁴ Soviet actions were also influenced by sharpening relations with the Peoples Republic of China and by the beginnings of the Nixon Administration's China policy.

Prior to the signing of the Moscow Treaty in 1970 and the later treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Soviet policies were still directed at attaining a solution to the "German Problem." In addition, the Soviets still needed to gain Western acceptance of the postwar borders in Eastern Europe; this was the

¹⁴Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Attitudes Toward MBFR and the USSR's Military Presence in Europe (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1972) p. 12.

goal of the Soviet's proposal for a European Security Conference. The linkage of the two conferences at the Moscow summit between President Nixon and First Secretary Brezhnev in May of 1972 launched MFR.

The year 1972 could well be considered a watershed in Soviet-American-European relations. The events of that year witnessed a solution to the German problem; the signing of a SALT I agreement firmly establishing Soviet-American strategic parity; and, finally, an agreement for convening a European Security Conference. These events proved to be major diplomatic accomplishments for the Soviet Union in return for which the Soviets had only to agree to begin negotiations at Vienna. While both the CSCE and the MFR talks were initiated in 1973, the Soviet Union continued to place most of its emphasis on the former. When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975 providing the Soviet Union with its desired recognition of the Eastern European status quo, there was still no apparent progress at Vienna. In fact, the Soviet negotiators had made no concessions since their initial proposal in 1973. It would seem that since the Soviets had achieved their desired political goals concerning Eastern Europe at Helsinki, they felt no real need to actively pursue the negotiations in Vienna.¹⁵

However, another reason for the Soviet's intransigence at Vienna may be explained by the status of the SALT talks. Prior to making any agreement at Vienna, it would seem logical for the Soviets to codify

¹⁵Ranger, op. cit., p. 67.

their nuclear equality/superiority vis-a-vis the United States as they did in 1972. Moreover, the current SALT talks are still dealing with a number of issues that could have a significant impact on the MFR discussions should they not be decided under the SALT accord. Included in this category would be weapons such as the Soviet Backfire bomber and the SS-20 IRBM, as well as the problem of the United States' forward based system (FBS) and the cruise missile. All of these weapons are inherently part of the European regional balance.

The FBS problem was excluded from the SALT I agreement at American insistence and so far has not been reintroduced, possibly because of being superseded by the cruise missile question. However, FBS remains a central issue in the European balance, both because it remains part of NATO's strategy and because of its symbolic value. Some observers suggest that the Soviets dropped the issue because they feared an expansion of the geographical limits of the reduction area would bring Soviet IRBM/MRBM and medium bomber forces into the negotiations, and because they felt that a reduction in the U.S. nuclear guarantee might somehow result in a West German nuclear option.¹⁶

It also seems evident that the Soviet Union is continuing its efforts to solve the ever present "German Problem." This is most evident in the Warsaw Pact's continuing adherence to its proposals concerning national ceilings. Certainly it is hoped that by having this principle enshrined in an MFR accord that a legal ceiling could be placed on the Bundeswehr.

¹⁶William F. Lackman, Jr., and Mark E. Miller, The Issue of Forward Based Systems in Arms Control Negotiations (Stanford: Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1976), p. 30.

Moreover, should the principle be accepted (along with a freeze on the introduction of forces upon commencing reductions) a permanent military status quo would have been established in Central Europe.

THE CHANGING POLITICAL MILIEU

The European political climate has witnessed a marked transformation since the Vienna negotiations began. In 1973 NATO was faced with an economic crisis (Nixon's NEP and the oil crisis of 1973) and with a crisis in cooperation following the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Along with these problems, NATO weathered the "Year of Europe," The Watergate scandal, the American withdrawal from Vietnam, and finally the PRM-10 leak. However, these problems were accompanied by a shift in American public opinion. The pressure on Congress for unilateral American troop reductions dissipated and, in fact, a shift towards increased defense spending evolved. This situation derived in many respects from the debate over strategic arms policies prompted by the SALT negotiations, and as a result of studies prompted by the MFR talks. Congressional publications since 1973 are resplendent with studies on the conventional and nuclear balance in NATO, representing both points of view. The important point, however, is that overseas force reduction proposals no longer enjoy a permissive atmosphere in the United States. This change has apparently been significant enough that the Federal Republic felt sufficiently secure to take the initiative in developing a new proposal for submission in Vienna.¹⁷

Soviet actions have also undergone a change since the negotiations began in 1973. Most notably the increasing Soviet activity in Africa

¹⁷"Bonn Will Submit MBFR Compromise," Die Welt, September 1, 1977, p. 2.

which culminated in the "confrontation" between the Soviet Union and the United States in May-June 1978. While it would certainly seem that the fears being expressed of a return to the "cold war" of the Truman era are some what premature, there does appear to be a more antagonistic attitude between the Carter Administration and the Soviet leadership than was previously the case. President Carter's apparent support for national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's intransigence toward the stalled SALT negotiations in May of 1978,¹⁸ apparently prompted Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's comment that the Warsaw Pact would finally consider the West's demand for asymmetrical troops cuts in Vienna.¹⁹ While this would seem to indicate some progress, Brezhnev's stance could also be viewed as simply another example of granting a seeming concession at one negotiation (MFR) in an attempt to achieve a gain at a more important one (SALT).

From the current perspective, there appears to have been no real change in the negotiating positions or objectives of the two alliances. The Soviet position at Vienna continues to reflect a determination to maintain the status quo, to establish controls over the Bundeswehr if possible, and to foster division within the NATO front whenever possible. The continuing Soviet build up and modernization of its conventional and "tactical" nuclear forces (SS-20) in Eastern Europe would tend to support

¹⁸"Brzezinski Delivers Attack on Soviets." The Washington Post, May 29, 1978, p. A1.

¹⁹U.S. News & World Report, June 26, 1978, p. 8.

the argument that no real change in purpose has occurred. Similarly, NATO's force modernization and build up seems designed to counter the conventional build up of the Warsaw Pact. More important, the technological advances being developed by NATO (especially grey area weapons technologies) to offset the Pact's conventional superiority seem destined to further complicate the military "balance" issue at Vienna.

NATO negotiating objectives still appear to be in accordance with Ambassador Resor's call for "... a more stable military balance in Central Europe at lower levels of forces with undiminished security for each party...."²⁰ No common definition of "undiminished security" has been reached between the two sides, with the Soviets clinging to the status quo, while NATO attempts to reduce the disparities between the two sides. So far, it would seem that the negotiations are still being conducted on the military level, with the two sides attempting to find a technical means for striking a balance. However, as the analysis in chapter two demonstrated, it appears doubtful that such a balance can be reached without the intervention of political forces in the negotiating process. In this respect, progress at Vienna should not be expected until a reduction agreement becomes a political objective rather than a technical one. However, the solution would not necessarily have to be found through the type of "back channel" negotiations conducted by Henry Kissinger during the SALT I discussions.²¹

²⁰ A Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs: After the War,
op. cit., p. 35.

²¹ James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy
and World Order (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), p. 549.

CHAPTER VIII

PROSPECTS AND PROGRESS

Writing in early 1973, John Yochelson outlined the essential problems to be faced at the Vienna negotiations. At that time he proposed three possible approaches to the Vienna negotiations, which he labeled the "Quick Fix," the "Ever-Present Balance," and the "Protracted Parley."¹ Each of these three approaches was designed to respond to the essential question at Vienna, which was and still is, "to what degree do shared superpower interests transcend alliance commitments?"²

The heart of the Quick Fix strategy was to have been a relatively simple negotiating framework that would, in essence, have been a political accord between the two superpowers based on a commitment either to re-deploy or deactivate agreed numbers of troops.³ Such a strategy would have deflated Congressional pressures for unilateral American reductions, while framing a compromise between American desires for asymmetrical cuts and Soviet desires for one-for-one reductions. However, this plan would have reflected an essentially bilateral agreement as opposed to bloc-to-bloc discussions and, therefore, would have been a political arrangement

¹John Yochelson, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe," Survival (November/December 1973): 276-280.

²Ibid., p. 275.

³Ibid.

between the United States and the Soviet Union (much the same as SALT I). This tactic was not adopted since it would have played to exactly that outcome which the European NATO members most feared; a United States-Soviet condominium.

Yochelson's third strategy, the "Protracted Parley," envisioned a conscious decision by the United States and NATO to undertake "... a calculated initiative to alter (present) security relationships, its objective being gradually to loosen the hold of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe."⁴ The apparent drawback to this strategy in 1973 was the questionable ability of the White House to garner sufficient backing to support such extended negotiations.

The second strategy proposed by Mr. Yochelson was the "Ever-Present Balance," which included a widening of the scope of negotiations, as opposed to the Quick Fix strategy, to include not only the manpower issue, but such other considerations as geography, lines of communication, maneuver area and the issue of mobilization capabilities.⁵

To a very great extent, these three options have framed the problems associated with the MFR talks since 1973. The Quick Fix strategy was not adopted by NATO since it implied a bilateral political arrangement between the Soviet Union and the United States, and would have greatly exacerbated already serious European NATO fears about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. However, it is doubtful if the Soviet Union would have agreed to the Quick Fix strategy, since the Soviets were

⁴Ibid., p. 280.

⁵Ibid., p. 278.

only at Vienna as a quid pro quo for the convening of CSCE, which had already been accomplished. Thus, Soviet goals at Vienna could probably best be fulfilled by adhering to the Extended Parley strategy.

Western proposals at Vienna can best be described as typical of Yochelson's Ever Present Balance. The negotiations, at least the justifications for negotiating positions, have been expanded to include virtually all of the issues he described. NATO proposals represented a "lowest common denominator" approach, reflecting a mixture of the American preference for technical arms control and the European desire for a more political approach. A typical Congressional view of MFR during the initial negotiating period was as follows: "NATO views MBFR as a way to get Soviet troops reductions in return for U.S. troop reductions, and thus prevent European conventional forces from disintegrating in the face of U.S. unilateral reductions."⁶ This reflected an attempt to achieve equal or increased military and political security for Europe at less cost, while also guaranteeing a floor on U.S. troops in Western Europe.⁷

This approach, however, was hardly appropriate in dealing with the Soviet Union, which had come to Vienna only reluctantly, and whose primary objective in the MFR talks was to maintain and, if possible, "legalize" the existing "correlation of forces" in Central Europe. Additionally, the Soviets hoped to exploit an opportunity to solidify the military position of the Warsaw Pact through concessions gained at Vienna and the possibility of achieving firm ceilings on the Bundeswehr. The

⁶Nunn, Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷Ranger, op. cit., p. 106.

unexpected solidarity among the NATO allies, along with a reduction of domestic political pressure within the United States, has so far prevented the attainment of these objectives. However, in attempting to assess future Soviet intentions it is necessary to ask several questions. Has the negotiating environment changed significantly? Have the roles of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe changed? Will a force reduction agreement as presently envisioned by NATO meet the professed security requirements of the two alliances? What options exist for NATO in the talks?

THE NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT

An analysis of the negotiating environment reveals significant changes, as was previously noted. Domestic pressures within the United States for unilateral force reductions are dormant, and the MFR negotiations have been successful in holding at bay similar pressures in Europe. Economic pressures against American overseas commitments were stemmed by European offset agreements and improving international economic conditions, but the continuing slide of the dollar in 1977 and 1978 could easily trigger renewed calls for increased offsets, which the Europeans might be loath to fulfill, or troop reductions.

The MFR negotiations were initiated following the completion of SALT I, which codified Soviet-American strategic parity, during a period when detente was flourishing (as evidenced by CSCE and the success of Brandt's ostpolitik). The present discussions are being conducted in the shadow of the SALT II negotiations, which give the impression of codifying Soviet strategic superiority. Moreover, the conventional balance in Central Europe continues to move against NATO, while detente

suffers from US-Soviet tension over Soviet actions in the horn of Africa. In addition, there is little reason for suspecting that the ideological confrontation between the West and East is any less important in 1978 than in 1973. Perhaps most important, the perception of the balance and the goals of MFR are changing, at least for the United States. Whereas in the early period of the Vienna negotiations NATO forces were usually defined as the equal of Warsaw Pact forces, if not in quantity at least in quality, a different theme is now beginning to emerge. Both NATO strategy and force structure are beginning to receive criticism, to a great extent due to an intensive study of the issues. According to Senator Sam Nunn, "... the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies are rapidly moving toward a decisive conventional superiority over NATO."⁸ Moreover, he noted that "the viability of (the) current NATO force posture in Europe and perhaps even NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defense is questionable."⁹ Thus, there appears to be a change in the overall framework within which MFR must be conducted, as well as a shift in American domestic attitudes.

SOVIET SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

In contrast to the negotiating environment, the role of Soviet military power in Eastern Europe has remained fairly consistent. Soviet troops deployed in Central Europe still serve to secure a buffer zone between West Europe and the Soviet Union. While the numbers of Soviet

⁸Nunn and Bartlett, op. cit., p. 1.

⁹Ibid.

forces stationed in Eastern Europe may exceed that deemed appropriate by the West, from the Soviet perspective they probably appear barely adequate when compared to the capabilities of technologically sophisticated NATO forces.

In addition to their security role, Soviet forces function as an extension of Soviet political power in Eastern Europe, and insure that no more disturbances, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, occur within the Eastern European glacis.¹⁰ This is especially true at present, as the current wave of "Euro-Communism" sweeps the West. The Soviet Union's inability to deal with this movement effectively is demonstrated by Moscow's apparent preference for the French Socialist Party at the expense of Georges Marchais and the French Communist Party. Under these circumstances, the Soviet leadership would be loath to undertake any significant force reductions in Central Europe, especially until the future of post-Tito Yugoslavia becomes more clear.

PROSPECTIVE PROPOSALS

Since the NATO allies began consultation on possible force reduction options in the late 1960's a number of different proposals have surfaced (excluding those put forward by the Warsaw Pact). The initial proposal offered by NATO in 1973 dealt almost exclusively with reductions in manpower, primarily since it was felt that this was the simplest measure of force capabilities, and would be the easiest to negotiate. The initial

¹⁰Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

Western proposal demanded equal reductions by both alliances to a common ceiling. One study of these proposals points out that a reduction to a common ceiling places NATO in a disadvantageous position in relation to the balance of combat divisions remaining, especially when this balance is viewed in terms of how a battle would actually be conducted.¹¹ This view is reflected in European studies as well:

In any event, WP (Warsaw Pact) developments in the improvement of mobility make any concessions that NATO would serve to gain, even by a very asymmetrical force reduction, something of a mirage.¹²

Alternative methods of personnel reductions have been proposed, such as cuts in reserve forces or in para-military formations.¹³ However, these recommendations are aimed primarily at the mobilization issue, which is one of the major problems blocking a consensus on what constitutes a "balance" in Central Europe.

Other proposals have recommended reductions in entire units (however there are fewer NATO units which results in disproportionate reduction), or in specific weapons such as tanks, aircraft or artillery. In all of these areas NATO would suffer a correspondingly larger loss of combat power because of its lower density of equipment. Even the 1975 Western proposal to reduce its tactical nuclear stockpile was recognized as a "strawman" by both West and East, especially since tactical nuclear weapons are an

¹¹Canby, op. cit., p. 124.

¹²Horhager, op. cit., p. 192

¹³J.I. Coffey, Arms Control and European Security (London: Chatto and Windus, 1977), p. 145.

integral part of the NATO strategy. Thus far, it has not been possible to establish a reduction formula, asymmetrical or symmetrical, that could satisfy the needs for a balance and the security requirements of the two alliances. It therefore seems highly unlikely that any further progress is possible through this "technical" method of arms control. A realization of this circumstance is reflected in the 1977 report by Senators Nunn and Bartlett:

In our opinion the main objectives of MBFR should be to reduce Soviet fire power in the Guidelines Area, to provide the necessary verification means to insure it is not reintroduced, and to take steps which would improve early warning of impending attack.¹⁴

THE OPTIONS

Given the impasse that has existed for the past five years, which shows signs of being extended by technological advances, the first logical option would be to simply discontinue the negotiations as unprofitable. This course of action appears infeasible, however, because of domestic opposition which such a move would certainly generate. Moreover, a strong case can be made for continuing the discussions simply as a forum for exchanging views and measuring the progress of detente.

On the other hand, both blocs could decide to seriously compromise on their demands in order to move towards an agreement. The recent NATO agreement to commit other direct NATO participants besides the United States to specific cuts in the second phase of reductions marks

¹⁴Nunn and Bartlett, op. cit., p. 16.

a major compromise. Especially since this at least hints at the Soviet goal of achieving individual national ceilings. Along with this proposal, Secretary Brezhnev's tacit agreement to consider asymmetrical reductions might indicate a lessening of Soviet intransigence on that issue. However, given the fact that Soviet and NATO goals in Central Europe have not really changed, it may be more profitable to view these proposals more in the context of the search for a SALT II accord.

A FINAL ALTERNATIVE

A last option, one which seems to hold at least some promise, would be to adopt John Yochelson's "Extended Parley" option. A serious and coordinated implementation of this option would provide NATO with a number of benefits. First, should NATO manage to place the common good above national economic interests, the studies generated thus far by MFR provide an excellent format for the reorganization and rationalization of the military structure of the alliance. The achievement of this goal alone (rationalization and standardization) would significantly increase the capability and credibility of the alliance. Second, such a program would provide NATO with a political objective instead of a purely reactive military one. This in itself would be a major step forward in true intra-NATO cooperation.

Most importantly, however, no prospect exists for a force reduction agreement at Vienna until such time as such a political decision is made by the two superpowers (the United States in conjunction with NATO) to do so. Just as the SALT I negotiations foundered until the Nixon-

Breshnev summit, the MFR negotiations must await a similar political decision. It is unlikely that any real movement will be made at Vienna until the results of SALT II are known, since the global balance really subsumes the MFR regional negotiations.

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